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Abstract—An electronic contracting system intended for mon-
itoring and/or enforcement of business-to-business interactions
to ensure that they comply with the rights, obligations and
prohibitions stipulated in contract clauses requires a machine
interpretable specification of the relevant parts of the legal
contract in force. Within this context, Event Condition Action
(ECA) rules are widely used for representing contracts. Naturally,
it is important to verify the correctness properties of such a
contract before its deployment. To this end, the paper adopts the
use of model-checking techniques. A high-level model–checking
tool has been developed that enables a designer to encode a
contract for model checking directly as ECA rules in terms
of contract entities: business operations, role players with their
rights, obligations and prohibitions. This not only simplifies the
task of model building but also, the designer can specify the
correctness requirements, in linear temporal logic, directly in
terms of the contract entities. The tool has been implemented by
extending the PROMELA language of the SPIN model checker.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fulfilling a given business function (e.g., order processing)
electronically requires business partners to exchange elec-
tronic business documents and to act on them. Naturally, the
exchanges and actions undertaken need to comply with the
business agreement (contract) currently in force between the
partners. Compliance checking can be automated with the help
of electronic contracting systems that can also be used for
detecting contract violations, facilitating dispute resolution and
determining liability by providing an audit trail of business
interactions. An electronic contracting system will require a
machine interpretable specification of relevant parts of the
legal contract in force. It is important to verify the correctness
properties of such an electronic contract before its deployment.
The intended meaning of contract clauses expressed in a natu-
ral language can be remarkably hard to capture and represent
in a rigorous and concise manner for computer processing.
There is thus a strong case for developing tools for contract
verification.
This paper describes a model-checking based tool intended
for electronic contracts encoded using Event Condition Action
(ECA) rules. We chose ECA rules because of their wide
spread usage in the business world for representing business
agreements. Our tool supports a very traditional approach to
system building: a model of the system is first constructed
and verified against a set of key correctness requirements; the
model then provides the basis for the actual implementation
of the system.
The challenge is to build a model that is simple enough
to be reasoned about by humans and amenable to verifica-
tion by automated tools, yet at the same time, the model
should approximate the intended actual system sufficiently
closely to the extent that the task of building the actual
system satisfying the requirements, given the model, becomes
a relatively straightforward process. The constructed system
must be validated to make sure that it does indeed meet
the requirements that the model satisfied. Here again, the
verification techniques used for the model should provide
useful inputs for the generation of test cases for exercising
the constructed system.
We make use of a model checking technique that is widely
used for automatic verification of reactive systems. With this
technique, a model is constructed as a set of interacting state
machines and the model checker generates all possible states
of the model and checks that specified properties hold in
each state. From our experience, we have learnt that contract
designers need a model–checking tool that hides much of
the intricate details of constructing state machine models and
permits modelling of contract clauses directly in terms of
basic contract concepts of business operations, role players,
rights, obligations and prohibitions. For instance, the tool
should readily and intuitively allow to express that the role
player buyer is currently obliged to execute business operation
payment. Equally important, the tool should offer a notation
to express correctness requirements directly using essential
contract concepts and to verify them. For instance, it should
allow, the designer to express that a the role player buyer is
always obliged to execute payment operation for a given item,
exactly once.
We have realised that model–checking tools with these
highly desirable constructs are not available yet. A possible but
daunting and time–consuming way to address the problem is
to build such a tool from scratch. A more pragmatic alternative
(and the subject of exploration in this paper) is to build
such a tool using an existing model–checking tool originally
designed for validation of distributed applications such as
communication protocols and enhancing it with contract–
specific constructs.
In this work, we take the pragmatic alternative and explore
the possibility of taking advantage of the facilities of the
SPIN model checker [1], [2] in the verification and validation
of business contracts. We discuss the implementation of a
tool that is based on the extending the standard PROMELA
(language of SPIN) with the concept of business operation
and operators to manipulate it. For example, in extended
PROMELA, the designer can include in his model operations
like assign obligation delivery to the seller and express queries
like is the buyer currently obliged to pay?
Like many other model–checkers, SPIN can accept and
verify correctness constraints abstracted as safety and liveness
properties and expressed in LTL (Linear Temporal Logics)
formulae. This feature is of particular interest to our work
because, as discussed in [21], a large class of correctness
requirements of electronic contracts can be abstracted as
safety and liveness properties. This suggests that they can
be expressed in LTL formulae and verified by conventional
model–checkers like SPIN.
The justification for extending PROMELA, as opposite
to using the standard version, is that SPIN was originally
designed for verification of communications protocols. It was
designed to verify models written in PROMELA language
against correcteness properties (safety and liveness) expressed
in standard LTL formulae. Thus PROMELA provides con-
structs for modelling essential communication concepts such
as messages, channels and operations for sending and re-
ceiving messages from channels. Not surprisingly, standard
PROMELA offers only a few and very basic built–in data types
that include bit, byte and array together with basic operations
to manipulate them.
In principle and as demonstrated by our previous works (
[6], [13], [21]), PROMELA’s basic contructs are sufficient for
building models of electronic contracts. However, the encoding
of contract clauses in standard PROMELA, quickly turns into
an arduous task that engages the designer in language details
that distract him or her from the logical aspects of the model.
Thus it is worth exploring other alternatives.
The design process supported by our verification tool is
illustrated in Fig.1. We assume that (i) the contract has
been negotiated by the contracting parties and drawn up in
English (or other natural) language. (ii) The designer manually
converts the English text into an abstract model written in
our extended PROMELA language. In parallel, the designer
manually prepares a list of contract correctness requirements
(deduced from the contract clauses) into LTL formulae. (iii)
The designer inputs both the CB2B model and the LTL for-
mulae into the SPIN verifier and runs it to output verification
results.
The CB2B model (Contractual Business To Business inter-
action model) is constructed using the concepts of contract
compliance checking that we have developed earlier, and de-
scribed in [3]. It contains the clauses of the contract expressed
as ECA rules written in PROMELA. The concepts discussed
in [3] also underpin the rule based contract specification
language called EROP (for Events, Rights, Obligations and
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Fig. 1. Contract model checking framework.
Prohibitions) and a contract compliance checking service for
contracts written in EROP [4], [5]. Once a contract has been
verified using our tool, the ECA rules from the CB2B model
can be translated relatively easily into their EROP counterpart
(indeed, this process can be automated, although we have not
yet implemented this step). We have therefore a systematic
way of generating a machine interpretable contract. In a sep-
arate paper we have described how the model checker can be
used for generating test cases for the EROP system [6]. Thus
our tool, built using a very widely available model checker,
provides a comprehensive framework for contract verification
and validation. In this paper we describe the structure of the
CB2B model and illustrate its use by taking a hypothetical
internet service provision contract that has been used by other
researchers for illustrating contract verification concepts and
techniques [7]. The next section describes the salient aspects of
contract compliance checking; in Section III we will describe
the CB2B model and its use for contract verification.
II. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE CHECKING
Contract clauses state what business operations the part-
ners are permitted (equivalently, have the right), obliged and
prohibited to execute. Informally, a right is something that a
business partner is allowed to do; an obligation is something
that a business partner is expected to do unless they wish
to take the risk of being penalised; finally, a prohibition is
something that a business partner is not expected to do unless
they are prepared to be penalised. The clauses also stipulate
when, in what order and by whom the operations are to be
executed. For instance, for a buyer-seller business partnership,
the contract would stipulate when purchase orders are to be
submitted, within how many days of receiving payment the
goods have to be delivered, and so on.
We consider an independent, third party contract monitoring
service called Contract Compliance Checker (CCC). The CCC
(see Fig. 2 which depicts the logical communication paths
between business partners and the CCC) is provided with an
executable specification of the contract in force; it is able
to observe and log the relevant business–to–business (B2B)
interaction events which it processes to determine whether the
actions of the business partners are consistent with respect to
the contract.
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Fig. 2. Contract compliance checking.
We assume that interaction between partners takes place
through a well defined set of primitive business operations
such as purchase order submission, invoice notification, and
so on; each operation typically involves the transfer of one or
two business documents. A business operation would normally
be implemented by a business conversation: a well defined
message interaction protocol with stringent message timing
and validity constraints (normally, a business message is
accepted for processing only if it is timely and satisfies specific
syntactic and semantic validity constraints). RosettaNet Partner
Interface Processes and ebXML industry standards serve as
good examples of such conversations [8], [9]. Following the
ebXML specification [9], we assume that once a conversation
is started, (i.e., a business operation is initiated) it always
completes to produce an execution outcome event from the set
{Success, BizFail, TecFail} whose elements represent respec-
tively a successful conclusion, a business failure or a technical
failure. BizFail and TecFail events model the (hopefully rare)
execution outcomes when, after a successful initiation, a party
is unable to reach the normal end of a conversation due to
exceptional situations. TecFail models protocol related failures
detected at the middleware level, such as a late, syntactically
incorrect or a missing message. BizFail models semantic errors
in a message detected at the business level, e.g., the goods-
delivery address extracted from the business document is
invalid.
Failure outcomes play an important role in making elec-
tronic contracts tolerant against infrastructure level problems,
as they provide a way of incorporating specific exceptional
clauses to deal with them [10]. For example, an exceptional
payment clause might be along the lines: ”failure to meet a
payment deadline due to business or technical reasons will
grant 5 days extension to the buyer”. Another example: ”If
the total number of business and technical failures exceed an
agreed bound, then online processing will be terminated”.
As indicated by the business events label of Fig.2, we
assume that the CCC is able to observe B2B interactions at
the granularity of outcome events of business operations. Each
such event contains information that includes the termination
status (Success, BizFail or TecFail), name of the operation, the
timestamp and other attributes to classify the operation further
(for example, the role player performing the operation). The
monitoring channel delivers these events to the CCC exactly
once in temporal order; these events are logged at the CCC.
Business partners exercise their contractual rights, obli-
gations and prohibitions by executing their corresponding
business operations. As operations are executed, rights, obli-
gations and prohibitions are granted to and revoked from
business partners. In general at a given moment, each busi-
ness partner can have several rights, several obligations and
several prohibitions, in force. This idea is at the heart of the
functionality of the CCC that is observing outcome events
of business operations. With each participant, also termed
a role player, we associate a ROP set, the set of Rights,
Obligations and Prohibitions currently in force. We use the
set B = {bo1, . . . , bon} of business operations to specify all
the primitive business operations stipulated in a contract.
For the CCC, the execution of a business operation boi is
said to be contract compliant if it satisfies the following three
requirements and is said to be non-contract-compliant if it
does not:
• C1) boi ∈ B;
• C2) it matches the ROP set of its role player (meaning, the
role player has a right/obligation/prohibition to perform
that operation);
• C3) it satisfies the constraints stipulated in the contractual
clauses.
A business operation that meets the first requirement is
termed valid else it is termed an unknown business operation.
A valid business operation that satisfies the second requirement
is termed matched, otherwise it is termed a mismatched
business operation; a matched business operation that does not
meet the third requirement is termed an out of context business
operation.
Consider an example contract clause: ”the buyer is obliged
to submit payment within 5 days of sending the purchase
order”. A payment operation performed by the buyer within
5 days (a constraint) will be contract compliant, whereas the
operation performed after 5 days will be out of context.
A terminated contractual interaction is classed as nor-
mally terminated if there are no pending obligations (all
the obligations have been fulfilled). On the other hand, a
contract violation occurs if the termination leaves one or
more unfulfilled obligations. Note that contract violation is
defined based on the final, terminated state of the contractual
interaction and is distinct from any violation (non fulfllment)
of an obligation that could occur during an interaction; such
a violation normally leads to sanctions coming in force and if
these are honoured, then the contractual interaction could still
end normally.1
Elsewhere we have argued that the concepts presented
above form a sound basis for constructing contract compliance
checking systems and rule based contract languages [3] .
Basically, a CCC (see Fig. 2) has an event queue for storing
incoming events that represent execution outcomes of business
operations. It executes the following algorithm:
1) Fetch the first event e from the Event Queue;
1Sanctions are obligations that come in force when the primary obligations
are violated.
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2) Identify the relevant rule for e;
3) For the selected rule r, if conditions C1, C2 and C3 are
satisfied (the operation is contract compliant), execute
the actions listed in the body of the rule; the main action
here is the updating (addition and deletion of rights,
obligations and prohibitions) of the current state of the
ROP sets; return to step 1.
In a practical implementation of a CCC, testing for con-
ditions C1 and C2 can be made a standard part of event
processing in step 1, so the ’condition’ part of a rule in step
3 need only be concerned with checking for C3. We use a
simple example (taken from [11]) to illustrate how rules are
constructed; the example will also motivate the reader for the
need for verification.
The significance of the ROP sets is that they allow us to
abstract the behaviour of the CCC as a reactive system [3]. As
a reactive system, the CCC remains in a given state waiting
for the arrival of events. When an event arrives that represents
a contract compliant operation, the CCC changes its state,
otherwise the event is flagged as non-contract compliant and
no state change occurs. Thus, a CCC with a correctly coded
contract rules will have the property that a contract compliant
business operation is never flagged as non-contract compliant.
Let us consider a very simple contract fragment involving
just one role player who is repeatedly performing operations,
’a’ followed by ’b’ or ’c’ under a constraint stated as follows:
there is an obligation to choose between doing ’b’ or ’c’ after
’a’, and a prohibition on doing ’b’ if ’b’ has been performed.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that operations always
terminate successfully (there are no BizFail and TecFail). The
pseudo code of the rules is shown in Fig. 3. There are three
rules corresponding to events representing the execution of the
corresponding business operations.
ContractRule “a”  
{ 
     if IS_R(a){ 
         SET_R(a, FALSE); 
         Choice{ 
                :: SET_O(b, TRUE); 
                :: SET_O(c, TRUE); 
           } 
} 
 
ContractRule “b” 
{ 
     If IS_O(b){ 
         SET_O(b, FALSE); 
         SET_P(b, TRUE); 
         SET_R(a, TRUE); 
      } 
      if IS_P(b){ 
          SET_R(a, TRUE); 
       } 
} 
ContractRule “c” 
{ 
     if IS_O(c) { 
         SET_O(c, FALSE); 
         SET_R(a, TRUE); 
      } 
} 
Fig. 3. Simple contract rules example.
Let us see how the ROP set is manipulated in the rule
for ’a’: check that there is a right to perform ’a’ (IS R(a)
returns TRUE), and if so, that right is now removed (as ’a’
has been performed) and obligation to perform either ’b’ or
’c’ (chosen non–deterministically) is inserted. In the rules for
’b’ and ’c’, the right to perform ’a’ is inserted again. At a first
glance, these rules seem to be an accurate representation of
the contract. We would like to make sure that the rules satisfy
the following requirement: there should be no simultaneous
obligation and prohibition on executing operation ’b’. It turns
out that our rules do not meet this requirement. Fig. 4(a) shows
the membership of the ROP set for one particular execution:
operations ’a’ followed by ’b’ followed by ’a’, and in the
second execution of ’a’, ’b’ is chosen again; now there is
obligation as well as prohibition to perform ’b’.
a b
a
O(b)
P(b), R(a)
P(b), O(b)
(a)
ContractRule “a”  
{ 
     if IS_R(a){ 
         SET_R(a, FALSE); 
         Choice{ 
                :: if not IS_P(b){ 
                              SET_O(b, TRUE); 
                              } 
                 :: SET_O(c, TRUE); 
           } 
       } 
} 
(b)
Fig. 4. (a) inconsistent assignment of prohibition and obligation (b) rule ’a’
modified.
Our encoding of rule for ’a’ is not quite right. The corrected
rule is shown in Fig.4(b); we make sure now that the obligation
to perform ’b’ is inserted only when there is no prohibition
on it.
III. CB2B MODEL
A. Introduction
In our earlier work, we used PROMELA directly to model
CCC and the rules [13]. We quickly realised that with pure
PROMELA, encoding of contract rules can be an arduous task.
Lack of data types other than the built-in types bit, byte, array,
etc., is seen as a serious restriction to use the PROMELA as a
specification language instead of protocol modeling language
[12]. However, the language can be extended to add user
defined data types. The typedef construct can be used to define
new data types and the inline and/or cpp macros can be used
to define operations on such new data types.
On this basis, we have implemented an abstract data type
extension to the standard PROMELA called BIS OP. We also
implemented a set of operations on the BIS OP data type
to maintain information about ROP sets. We added these
enhancements at user level, thus they do not impact the SPIN
source code.
These additional facilities, not only simplifies the task of
writing rules, but also, help the designer specify the correct-
ness requirements, in linear temporal logic, directly in terms
of the contract entities. This design together with the various
language notations are discussed in the next subsection. Here
we give a flavour by showing how the rules for the simple ex-
ample discussed earlier will look like in extended PROMELA
(see Fig.5). Recall that the contract fragment is ”There is an
obligation to choose between doing ’b’ or ’c’ after ’a’, and
a prohibition on doing ’b’ if ’b’ has been performed”. We
are showing the corrected version of rule ’a’ here; following
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 RULE(a) 
{ 
  if  
        :: IS_R(a)‐>  
            SET_R(a,0); 
            if    
                 :: !IS_P(b)‐>  
      SET_O(b,1); 
                  :: SET_O(c,1); 
            fi;      
            RULE_DECI(CCR,CON); 
          :: else 
           RULE_DECI(NCC,CON); 
fi;   
} 
RULE(b)  
{   
   if :: IS_O(b) ‐>       
          SET_O(b,0); 
          SET_P(b,1);       
          SET_R(a,1); 
          RULE_DECI(CCO,CON); 
       :: IS_P(b)‐> 
           SET_R(a,1); 
           RULE_DECI(CCP,CON); 
       :: else 
           RULE_DECI(NCC,CON); 
   fi; 
} 
 
RULE(c)  
{       
   if :: IS_O(c)‐>  
          SET_O(c,0);  
          SET_R(a,1); 
          RULE_DECI(CCO,CON); 
       ::else 
          RULE_DECI(NCC,CON); 
    fi; 
} 
 
Fig. 5. Simple contract rules in extended PROMELA.
PROMELA, the choice between oblig(b) or oblig(c) in rule
’a’ will be chosen non–deterministically.
We can see that these rules closely resemble the pseudo code
discussed earlier. Each rule ends with a decision (sent to the
event generator) indicating whether the operation is contract
compliant (RULE DECI(CCR,CON)) or non–contract com-
pliant (RULE DECI(NCC,CON)); CON is short for continue,
indicating that event generation should continue, CCR, CCO
and CCP that appear in the rules are short for contract
compliant right, obligation and prohibition respectively, and
NCC is short for non–contract compliant.
The requirement that there should be no simultaneous obli-
gation and prohibition on executing operation ’b’ is written
in LTL as:
[](not( IS_O(b) && IS_P(b) ))
That is, always it is not possible to be obliged and prohibited
on executing business operation ’b’. If we had coded rule ’a’
incorrectly as mentioned earlier, model checking would have
revealed the error.
B. Model implementation
An abstract view of our framework is shown in Fig. 6.
The key component of the figure is the CB2B model which
essentially models the system depicted in Fig. 2. The LTL
formulae are the correctness requirements that the designer
wishes to validate as discussed in Fig. 1.
The Business Event Generator (BEG) represents the buyer
and seller, precisely, their interaction over the Internet, thus
it is responsible for generating business events, for example,
payment placed by buyer. The Contract Rules Manager (CRM)
together with the ROP sets and the ECA rules (rule base)
represents the CCC. The CRM is responsible for including
rules as needed. The BEG and CMR are communicated by two
uni-directional channels (BEG2R and R2BEG). The contract
rules are composed in a separate file and offered to CRM
via the usual #include mechanism. The ROP sets contain
information about the rights, obligations and prohibitions
currently in force.
The rule base contains a rule for each business event bei
representing the outcome of an operation execution; so for a
business operation say, ’submit purchase order’ there will be
Business
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Fig. 6. CB2B formal model.
a rule for the operation terminating successfully (S), and op-
tionally (depending on whether the contact has clauses dealing
with failure outcomes) a rule for the operation terminating in
a technical failure (TF) and one for the operation terminating
in a business failure (BF).
The executable behaviour of the CB2B model can be seen
as a set of read and write process operations:
1) BEG generates event bei and sends it through the
BEG2R channel;
2) CRM reads bei from the BEG2R channel;
3) CMR includes the contract rule Ri corresponding to bei;
4) Ri checks bei against the ROP sets (condition C2), and
executes the action if the associated condition, C3, is
satisfied;
5) Ri sends its decision about bei (either contract com-
pliant or non–contract–compliant) through the R2BEG
channel;
6) BEG extracts the decision from the R2BEG channel and
resumes its event generation process.
In our framework, a contract is specified by declaring a set
of business operations, role players and rules and some global
variables necessary for recording some aspect of contract
execution that might be required by rules or to express LTL
formulas (e.g, payment made, goods not delivered).
Table I summarises the operations defined on the BIS OP
abstract data type. We use boName to indicate business
operation name. A given instance of an operation records in
its associated ROP set whether a role player has the right,
obligation or prohibition to perform that operation. There are
’SET’ methods to grant/remove a right, obligation or prohi-
bition and ’IS’ methods to test whether a role player has the
right etc. SET X method is used to record that the operation
has been executed; that status can be checked by the IS X
method. These two methods are useful for implementing rules
for clauses such as ’send a reminder if the payment has not
been made’ or ’extend payment deadline if a technical failure
has occurred for payment’ (see [10] for more examples).
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Name Description
BIS OP(boName) Declares BIS OP of type typedef with the fields:name, index, Role-
Player, right, obligation, prohibition, execution status. Ex. - BIS OP
(offer)
SET R(boName,1) Gives (removes, when second parameter is 0) right to execute boName.
Ex.- SET R(offer,1)
SET O(boName,1) Assigns (removes, when second parameter is 0) obligation to execute
boName. Ex.- SET O (pay, 1)
SET P(boName,1) Sets (removes, when second parameter is 0) prohibition to execute
boName. Ex.- SET P(cancel,1)
IS R(boName,RolePlayer) Returns 1 if RolePlayer has permission to excute boName, 0 otherwise.
Ex.- IS R(offer, Seller)
IS O(boName, RolePlayer) Returns 1 if RolePlayer is obliged to excute boName, 0 otherwise.
Ex.- IS O (pay, Seller)
IS P(boName, RolePlayer) Returns 1 if RolePlayer is prohibited to execute boName, 0 otherwise.
Ex.- IS P (cancel, Buyer)
SET X(boName) Sets execution status of boName to 1. The default value is 0. Ex.-
SET X (offer) means offer has been executed.
IS X(boName) Returns 1 if boName has been executed. Ex.- IS X(offer)
INIT(boName,R,O,P,RolePlayer) Initiates BIS OP with RolePlayer, (R)ight, (O)bligation or
(P)rohibition. Ex.- INIT(offer,1,0,0,Seller)- means that Seller is
given the right to excute offer.
TABLE I
BIS O OPERATIONS LIST.
Name Description
CONTRACT(boName,status) Retrieves the execution status (S,BF,TF) of boName. Blocks if the
expected result is not available. Ex.-CONTRACT(offer,S) returns 1 if
offer has been executed with status S.
B E(boName,status) Sends an event with status (S,BF or TF) to the Rule Manager if
boName is currently a right, obligation or prohibition of a role player.
Ex.- B E(offer,S).
RULE DECI(m1,m2) Used by rules to notify the BEG about the outcome (m1) of the
execution of an operation and a request (m2) to generate the next
event. m1 is CCR, CCO or CCP (contract compliance right, contract
compliance obligation or contract compliance prohibition, respectively.
Alternatively, m1 is NCCR, NCCO or NCCP (non–contract compli-
ance right, non–contract compliance obligation or non–contract com-
pliance prohibition, respectively. m2 is either CON or CND (continue
or contract ended, respectively). Ex.- RULE DEC(CCR,CON).
RULE(boName,[status]){
Statements
}
The format of a business rule. boName is a business event. status is
optional an equal to S, BF or TF.
SYNCH(boName){
Statements
}
HCNYS(boName)
The statements are executed if boName has been executed before. Used
within a rule to do some actions only if boName has been executed.
TABLE II
CB2B OPERATIONS LIST.
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Table 2 shows the operations and control structures that
have been implemented as syntactic sugar; these supplement
PROMELA constructs such as statement sequencing, atomic
sequencing, concurrent execution, case selection, repetition
and unconditional jumps. There use will become clear in the
next section where we present a complete example.
We note that the following cyclic construct provides a
powerful way for the BEG process to generate business events:
do
:: B_E(a,S);
:: B_E(a,TF);
:: B_E(b,S);
:: B_E(c,S);
od
This construct in a given iteration will consider the
currently executable operations (see the explanation of
B E(boName,status)) and non–deterministically select one
event of that operation to be sent on the BEG2R channel.
Recall that in the earlier section dealing with contract
compliance, we had categorized business operations as valid
(satisfying condition C1), matched (satisfying conditions C1
and C2) and contract compliant (satisfying conditions C1
and C2 and C3). BEG can be programmed to generate any
combination of these. From the point of view of model
checking, a particularly important case is generation of se-
quences of events corresponding to the execution of contract
compliant operations only. This considerably reduces the size
of the state space for exploration yet enables checking that
rules are responding correctly to contract compliant business
operations (e.g., not flagging them as non-contract compliant).
A recommended way of model checking would be first to
verify the rules using the restricted state space of matched or
contract compliant operations and to remove any errors. Then
extend the state space of exploration by reprogramming the
BEG to generate events of valid operations. This aspect is
discussed further subsequently.
IV. CASE STUDY
We will illustrate our model checking framework by taking
a hypothetical internet service provision contract that has been
used by other researchers for illustrating contract verification
concepts and techniques [7]. We consider two parameters of
the service: high, low, denoting the client’s Internet traffic.
We abstract away several technical details on how the Internet
traffic is measured, and consider the following part of the
contract:
1) Whenever the Internet traffic is high then the client must
pay x$ immediately, or the client must notify the service
provider by sending an e-mail specifying that he will pay
later.
2) In case the client delays the payment, after notification
he must immediately lower the Internet traffic to low
level, and pay later 2 ∗ x$
3) if the client does not lower the Internet traffic immedi-
ately, then the client will pay 3 ∗ x$
4) The provider is forbidden to cancel the contract without
previous written notification by normal post and by e-
mail.
5) The provider is obliged to provide the services as stipu-
lated in the contract, and according to the law regulating
Internet services.
Normal condition is that the Internet traffic generated by
the client is low; if it goes to high, clause 1 comes into
effect. We model check beginning with the initial condition
of Internet traffic is high. Fig. 7 and Fig. 6 show the contract
encoding necessary for model checking. Referring to Fig.
7, we begin by declaring some global variables, such as
Payment, declaring two role players etc. We define a number
of business operations; their intended functions should be clear
from their names (so, PAY1 refers to x$ payment, PAY3 refers
to 3∗x$ payment, DELAY refers to the client deciding to delay
payment and so forth).
At this point we can write some LTL formulas that we
would like the ECA rules of the contract to satisfy. Here are
some essential LTL properties P1, P2 and P3:
P1: {[]((IS_X(DELAY) && IS_X(NOTIFY)) ->
<> (IS_X(LOWER) || IS_X(NOT_LOWER)))}
P2: {[] (IS_X(LOWER) -> <> IS_X(PAY2)) &&
[](IS_X(NOT_LOWER) -> <> IS_X(PAY3))}
P3: {[]((IS_X(SEND)&& IS_X(WRITE)) -> <> (IS_X(CANCEL)))}
Note that we are able express directly in terms of the
contract entities of the CB2B model. P1 states that if the client
performs DELAY and NOTIFY then the traffic is lowered
or not lowered. P2 captures the property that if the traffic is
lowered then eventually PAY2 is performed, but if the traffic is
not lowered, then eventually PAY3 is performed. P3 captures
the property that if the ISP cancels the service provision, then
he must have informed earlier by post (WRITE) and email
(SEND).
In the BEG process, we initialise the global variables, and
the business operations. So, Internet traffic is high, client
is initially obliged to make PAY1 payment and so forth.
The event generation loop has been programmed to generate
matched events (in this study, we assume that all operations
terminate successfully – there are no TF or BF). Note that we
need to preserve causality as well, so NOTIFY is generated
after DELAY.
Fig. 8 has all the required rules. The three payment rules are
simple and follow the same logic. If the client decides to delay
payment, he is obliged to lower the traffic after notification
(he has also the right to not lower the traffic, but in that case
he will be required to pay 3 ∗ x$). The rules for DELAY and
NOTIFY have been programmed accordingly; note the use of
’synch’ construct in these rules.
We used SPIN to verify that all the LTL formulas stated
here are satisfied by these contract rules. Other contract-
independent properties such as freedom from deadlock are
checked by SPIN by default.
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#include "BizOperation.h"
#include "setting.h"
#include "icrules.h"
byte Payment;
bool INTERNET_HIGH;
bool INTERNET_LOW;
RuleMessage(S,TF,BF);
RolePlayer(CLIENT,ISP);
BIS_OP(PAY1);
BIS_OP(PAY2);
BIS_OP(PAY3);
BIS_OP(DELAY);
BIS_OP(NOTIFY);
BIS_OP(LOWER);
BIS_OP(NOT_LOWER);
BIS_OP(CANCEL);
BIS_OP(SEND);
BIS_OP(WRITE);
proctype BEG()
{
contract:
INTERNET_HIGH = TRUE;
INTERNET_LOW = FALSE;
START();
INIT(PAY1,0,1,0,CLIENT);
INIT(PAY2,0,0,0,CLIENT);
INIT(PAY3,0,0,0,CLIENT);
INIT(DELAY,0,1,0,CLIENT);
INIT(NOTIFY,0,1,0,CLIENT);
INIT(LOWER,0,0,0,CLIENT);
INIT(NOT_LOWER,0,0,0,CLIENT);
INIT(SEND,1,0,0,ISP);
INIT(WRITE,1,0,0,ISP);
INIT(CANCEL,0,0,1,ISP);
do
::
if
:: B_E(PAY1,S) ;
:: B_E(DELAY,S) -> B_E(NOTIFY,S);
if
:: B_E(LOWER,S)
-> B_E(PAY2,S) ;
:: B_E(NOT_LOWER,S)
-> B_E(PAY3,S) ;
fi;
:: B_E(SEND,S) -> B_E(WRITE,S)
-> B_E(CANCEL,S);
fi;
od;
}
proctype CRM()
{
do
:: CONTRACT(PAY1,S);
:: CONTRACT(PAY2,S);
:: CONTRACT(PAY3,S);
:: CONTRACT(DELAY,S);
:: CONTRACT(NOTIFY,S);
:: CONTRACT(LOWER,S);
:: CONTRACT(NOT_LOWER,S);
:: CONTRACT(CANCEL,S);
:: CONTRACT(SEND,S);
:: CONTRACT(WRITE,S);
od;
}
init
{
atomic
{
run BEG();
run CRM();
}
}
Fig. 7. Initialisation, BEG and CRM.
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RULE(PAY1)
{
if
::IS_O(PAY1,CLIENT)->
SET_O(PAY1,0);
Payment = 1;
RULE_DECI(CCO,CND);
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(PAY2)
{
if
::IS_O(PAY2,CLIENT)->
SET_O(PAY2,0);
Payment = 2;
RULE_DECI(CCO,CND);
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(PAY3)
{
if
::IS_O(PAY3,CLIENT)->
SET_O(PAY3,0);
Payment = 3;
RULE_DECI(CCO,CND);
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(DELAY)
{
if
::IS_O(DELAY,CLIENT)->
d_step
{
SET_O(DELAY,0);
SET_O(PAY1,0);
synch(NOTIFY)
-> SET_O(LOWER,1);
-> SET_R(NOT_LOWER,1);
hcnys(NOTIFY)
}
RULE_DECI(CCO,CON);
::else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(NOTIFY)
{
if
::IS_O(NOTIFY,CLIENT)->
d_step
{
SET_O(NOTIFY,0);
SET_O(PAY1,0);
synch(DELAY)
-> SET_O(LOWER,1);
-> SET_R(NOT_LOWER,1);
hcnys(DELAY)
}
RULE_DECI(CCO,CON);
::else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(LOWER)
{
if
:: IS_O(LOWER,CLIENT)->
d_step
{
SET_O(LOWER,0);
SET_R(NOT_LOWER,0);
INTERNET_HIGH=FALSE;
INTERNET_LOW =TRUE;
SET_O(PAY2,1);
}
RULE_DECI(CCR,CON);
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(NOT_LOWER)
{
if
:: IS_R(NOT_LOWER,CLIENT)->
d_step
{
SET_R(NOT_LOWER,0);
SET_O(LOWER,0);
SET_O(PAY3,1);
}
RULE_DECI(CCR,CON);
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
RULE(WRITE)
{
if
::IS_R(WRITE,ISP)->
d_step
{
SET_R(WRITE,0);
synch(SEND)
-> SET_P(CANCEL,0);
-> SET_R(CANCEL,1);
hcnys(SEND);
}
RULE_DECI(CCR,CON);
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(SEND)
{
if
::IS_R(SEND,ISP)->
d_step
{
SET_R(SEND,0);
synch(WRITE)
-> SET_P(CANCEL,0);
-> SET_R(CANCEL,1);
hcnys(WRITE);
}
RULE_DECI(CCR,CON)
:: else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
RULE(CANCEL)
{
if
::IS_R(CANCEL,ISP)->
SET_R(CANCEL,0);
RULE_DECI(CCR,CNL)
::IS_P(CANCEL,ISP)->
RULE_DECI(CCP,CON)
::else
RULE_DECI(NCC,CON);
fi;
}
Fig. 8. Contract rules.
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V. EVALUATION OF THE MODEL
The case study is intended to demonstrate that the CB2B
model provides primitives for encoding a contract for model
checking directly as ECA rules in terms of contract entities:
business operations, the role players with their rights, obliga-
tions and prohibitions. These primitives that we have added to
PROMELA can be used to build contract models at different
levels of abstractions aimed at exploring specific properties
of the system. Abstraction is routinely used by designers to
reduce: a) the size of the state space of the model, b) its
complexity, or c) both [14].
The case study demonstrates how we use restriction to
reduce the size of the state space and the complexity of
the model (restriction called slicing in [15]). The size of
the state space and the complexity is reduced by removing
states, transitions and strengthening guards in the model. The
resulting model is a smaller model that covers only a subset
of the state space of the original model. Let us use M r, Ar
and Ar
s
to refer to the restricted model, its automaton and state
space, respectively. Notice that in M r we have strengthened
the guards in the BEG so that the BEG generates only
matched events, that is, events that satisfy conditions C1 and
C2. In other words, the model is suitable for exploring the
behaviour of the rules when they are triggered by matched
events. A more general model M with automaton A and state
space As can be built by removing the guards in the BEG
of M r so that the business event generator can provide the
rules with events that satisfy condition C1 but not necessarily
C2. Model M can be used to explore the behaviour of the
rules when triggered by any event. Since Ar
s
⊂ As, all the
behaviour of M r is covered by M . The motivation for using
M r at this early stage of the design is that Ar
s
is small, in
other words, easy to reason about and amenable to exhaustive
verification in no time; it is focused on the exploration of an
specific part of the state space As; the designer can use M r
to prove the absence of errors in M r and claim that M is free
from those errors as well.
Once we have confidence in the correctness of the contract,
one very useful function the model can serve is for generating
executable test cases for testing an implemented system. In
a separate paper we discuss this way of testing electronic
contracts [6].
VI. RELATED WORK
Number of papers on the subject of formal specification
contracts have been published [16], [17], [18], [19]. These
approaches consist of formal languages which would be hard
to use by business process developers. Other works like [4],
[20] aim to provide notations that are more suited to the needs
of business process developers, but of necessity sacrifice the
rigour of the formal approaches. Our approach is somewhere
in between the two, and provides a practical tool for the
specification and verification of contracts. To our knowledge,
few works have specifically considered the problem of model
checking of contracts [21], [13] [22], [7], [11].
In [21], automata are used to model the behaviours of the
contract participants. [13] uses PROMELA directly to model
CCC and the rules; the present paper takes that approach
further by extending PROMELA with primitives for repre-
senting contracts in a high level manner. In [7] the NuSMV
model checker is used to model and verify the properties of
contracts written in the contract language CL [19]. In [11] a
tool called CLAN is implemented for performing automatic
analysis of conflicting clauses written in CL language. The
natural language document specifying the contract is converted
into CL first, and then analysed using the CLAN tool.
In our work, we rely on an existing, well known model
checking tool (SPIN). The notations of the CB2B model
provide a relatively simple way of writing contracts in ECA
, a notation that can be used by business process developers
and others not familiar with model checking and formal spec-
ification notations. The CB2B model hides away the technical
details of the processes and the communication channels and
treats a contract simply as a set of ECA rules. The ECA rules
from the CB2B model can be translated relatively easy into
executable specifications, such as that supported by the EROP
language.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have described a model-checking based tool imple-
mented by extending Promela. The CB2B model of the tool
hides much of the intricate details of constructing interacting
state machines and enables a designer to encode a contract
for model checking directly as ECA rules in terms of contract
entities: business operations, role players with their rights,
obligations and prohibitions. Equally important, the designer
can specify the correctness requirements, in linear temporal
logic, directly in terms of the contract entities. The primitives
that we have added to PROMELA are at user level (that is,
without any changes to the SPIN source code) and can be
used to build contract models at different levels of abstractions
aimed at exploring specific properties of the system. In our
model, business operations are categorized as valid (satisfying
condition C1), matched (satisfying conditions C1 and C2) and
contract compliant (satisfying conditions C1 and C2 and C3).
The model’s event generator, BEG, can be programmed to
generate any combination of these. From the point of view of
model checking, a particularly important case would be gener-
ation of sequences of events corresponding to the execution of
matched operations only. This considerably reduces the size
of the state space for exploration yet enables checking that
rules are responding correctly to contract compliant business
operations. One can then extend the state space of exploration,
for example by reprogramming the BEG to generate events
satisfying condition C1 but not necessarily C2. CB2B model
provides convenient way of performing such experiments.
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